The bribery problem in elections asks whether an external agent can make some distinguished candidate win or prevent her from winning, by bribing some of the voters. This problem was studied with respect to the weighted swap distance between two votes by Elkind et al. [7] . We generalize this definition by introducing a bound on the distance between the original and the bribed votes. The distance measures we consider include a restriction of the weighted swap distance and variants of the footrule distance, which capture some real-world models of influence an external agent may have on the voters. We study constructive and destructive variants of distance bribery for k-approval and Borda elections, and obtain polynomial-time algorithms as well as NP-hardness results. These results answer a number of open questions from the literature.
Introduction
In an election in which voters influence the election's result by casting their votes they might not be the only agents interested in its outcome. A well known example of strategic influence on elections is bribery, formally introduced by Faliszewski et al. [9] (see also the book chapter by Faliszewski and Rothe [11] ). By paying voters with a resource, e. g. money, to change their vote, an external agent tries to change the election outcome to her advantage. In the constructive case the aim is to make a specific candidate a winner of the election, while in the destructive case the briber tries to prevent a candidate from winning. Originally the number of voters that can be bribed is limited. However, there is no limitation to the amount of change within a vote. It is natural to assume that a voter's cost for changing her vote to a large extent is higher than the cost for making small adjustments. This intuition is modeled in the microbribery problem introduced by Faliszewski et al. [10] , and in the swap-bribery problem introduced by Elkind et al. [7] . In both models the briber has to pay certain prices for swaps of adjacent candidates. In order to obtain a more realistic model, we propose to imply a bound on the distance between the truthful and the bribed votes.
The idea of limiting the difference between originally cast votes and their altered versions in strategic influences of elections is not restricted to bribery. Obraztsova and Elkind [16] have introduced distances to manipulation, where a voter changes her vote in order to subjectively improve the election outcome. They study the optimal manipulation problem with a focus on the unweighted swap distance and footrule distance, and the maximum displacement distance between the truthful and the strategic vote. We propose to extend the study of distances to both, the constructive and destructive bribery problem and use unweighted and weighted variants of the swap and footrule distance. One motivation for introducing a bound on the overall distance of the bribed profile follows from the work by Obraztsova and Elkind [16] on optimal manipulation. The distance between a truthful and a manipulative vote should be bounded since otherwise a manipulation may be detected more easily.
In a more positive sense bribery can be seen as a form of campaign management where an external actor tries to make her desired candidate win by running specific campaigns. While the swap distance counts the inversions of pairs of candidates, it is a more realistic approach to assign a weight to a specific swap. This models a campaign that focuses on the difference between these two candidates. The restriction of element-weighted distance functions (studied by Kumar and Vassilvitskii [14] for linear orders) assigns a weight to every candidate and the cost of a swap is the product of the corresponding weights. This can be seen as an indicator of how sure a voter is about the position of a candidate in the vote. The same weight functions can also be applied to the footrule distance. Instead of inversions, here the positions a candidate is shifted by are counted.
We will study the computational complexity of distance bribery for plurality, veto, k-approval and Borda elections. As distances we consider swap and footrule distances in the unweighted, element-weighted, and weighted case. Our results include polynomial-time algorithms obtained through some network-flow algorithm and NP-completeness results. A detailed overview of all results will be presented in Section 3 in Table 1 , after all needed notions are formally introduced.
Preliminaries
In this section we first provide the basics on elections and then introduce the different forms of distances.
Elections
An election is a pair (C, V ) with a set of candidates C and a list of voters V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) (also called profile), where a vote v i is associated with a preference order > vi over the candidates. If the vote v i is clear from the context we omit the index or simply write > i . The set of all linear orders over the candidates in C will be denoted by L(C). The position of candidate c in vote v i will be denoted by pos(v i , c), and the candidate on position k in vote v i will be denoted by cand(v i , k). For two lists A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and B = (b 1 , . . . , b k ) of votes let A ∪ B = (a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b k ) be the concatenation of both lists. A voting rule is a function E that maps an election (C, V ) to an element of 2 C . In this paper tie-breaking is not an issue since we focus on the so-called non-unique winner model, where a bribery action is successful if the designated candidate is one of the winning candidates in the constructive case, and if she is none of the winners in the destructive case.
We will consider different voting rules, all belonging to the class of scoring rules. Every candidate gets points according to her position in each vote, and the winners are those with the maximum number of points. The plurality rule gives only one point for a first position, whereas the k-approval rule gives one point to every candidate placed in the top k positions of a vote. Accordingly the veto and k-veto rule give one point to all candidates but the candidate(s) in the last/last k positions who get zero points. In addition we will consider the Borda rule, where in an election with m candidates the first placed candidate gets m − 1 points, the second one m − 2, up to the last candidate who gets 0 points. By score (C,V ) (c) we denote the points that candidate c gets in the election (C, V ).
Distances
Now we will introduce different distance measures. Formally, a distance measure d on a space A is a mapping d : A×A → R that fulfills the following properties for all a, b, c ∈ A:
) (triangle inequality). We will focus on distances between votes. For a fixed set of candidates this is a distance of the form d : L(C) × L(C) → R. As we will study the complexity of problems involving such distances we actually consider a family of distances (d m ) m≥1 that contains one distance function for each possible candidate set size m. The two basic distance measures we consider are the swap distance and the footrule distance. For two votes v and v from L(C) the swap distance swap(v, v ) counts the number of inverted pairs and is formally defined as swap(v, v ) = |{(c, b) ∈ C × C | c > v b and b > v c}|. Beside the swap distance, we will also consider the footrule distance. Instead of counting swaps, this distance counts the positions that a candidate needs to be shifted by to obtain the target order. The footrule distance fr(v, v ) is defined as: fr(v, v ) = c∈C |pos(v, c) − pos(v , c)|.
In addition to the well-known unweighted versions of these distance measures we also consider weighted forms. The most general form is the weighted swap distance which is also used for the swap bribery problem (see Elkind et al. [7] ). In order to define the weighted distance we introduce the general notion of a cost function π : C × C → N 0 , that assigns a weight to each pair of candidates. We will always assume that π(c, c) = 0 for every c ∈ C. For matters of consistency we sometimes denote the unweighted distances by fr π and swap π , where the cost function is π(c, b) = 1 for all c, b ∈ C, c = b. The following example illustrates how these distances are calculated.
Example 2 Consider the votes v : p > q > r > s > t and v : p > s > r > q > t. The swap distance is swap(v, v ) = |{(q, r), (q, s), (r, s)}| = 3, i. e., the number of times adjacent candidates have to be swapped. For a cost function π, the weighted swap distance is the sum of the costs of these pairs: swap w π (v, v ) = π(q, r) + π(q, s) + π(r, s). The unweighted footrule distance is fr(v, v ) = |2 − 4| + |4 − 2| = 4, whereas the weighted footrule distance for a cost function π is fr
In addition to these general weighted distances we will consider a special weighted variant that corresponds to the element-weighted distances described by Kumar and Vassilvitskii [14] . In the element-weighted swap/footrule distance (denoted by swap ew π and fr ew π respectively), the function π is restricted to the form π(c, b) = ϕ(c) · ϕ(b), where ϕ : C → N 0 is a function that assigns a weight to every candidate. While our distances are obviously heavily inspired by the weighted distances proposed by Kumar and Vassilvitskii [14] , they actually differ widely. Their distances are invariant, i. e., they are not dependent on the actual identity of each element but on the permutation in-between vote v and v . Our distances are not invariant for a good reason. They should depend on the identity of each candidate and the measurable differences or similarities between them.
The metric properties are still fulfilled for our definition of the element-weighted swap distance since it is a special case of the weighted swap distance, for which it is not hard to show these properties. For the triangle inequality note that each inversion between a and c is part of the inversions between a and b or b and c. Non-negativity, identity of indiscernibles, and symmetry are obviously also fulfilled for the weighted footrule distance. For the triangle inequality note that (again) each inversion between a and c is part of the inversions between a and b or b and c. Splitting the sums up in-between a to b inversions and b to c inversions and calculating the absolutes of both differences individually at least increases the overall value. Note that if costs of 0 are allowed, all distance measures only fulfill the requirements for a pseudometric, i. e., the identity of indiscernibles is replaced by the property d(a, a) = 0.
Even though the element-weighted swap and footrule distances focus on different aspects of the differences between two votes, it can be shown that they are somehow related, and we will make use of this in our proofs. The Diaconis-Graham inequality also holds for the element-weighted distances used in this paper.
Lemma 3 For a list of candidates
While the definitions of the overall element-weighted distances differ from those by Kumar and Vassilvitskii [14] , the idea of the proof of this lemma is transferable: The element-weighted votes are substituted with unweighted votes, where each candidate c is replaced by ϕ(c) copies. Since the distance values for the weighted and unweighted case of the swap and footrule distance are equal, the Diaconis-Graham inequality is passed from the unweighted to the weighted case. Now we will define decision problems in order to study their computational complexity. For details on computational complexity we refer to the textbooks by Papadimitriou [17] and Arora and Barak [1] . The study of the computational complexity of such manipulative actions is important, since in the context of voting in multi-agent systems it is crucial to know about the possibility of external intervention. Of course, a worst-case complexity analysis is only the first step and should be followed by a more fine-grained analysis and the design of fast algorithms for the average case.
The original bribery problem asks if for a given election a designated candidate can be turned into a winner of the election by bribing a specific number of candidates, whereas the swap bribery problem (introduced by Elkind et al. [7] ) requires that the costs for the swaps of adjacent candidates may not exceed a budget. In the related shift bribery problem, also introduced by Elkind et al. [7] , only swaps involving the desired candidate are allowed. For a given distance function D and a voting rule E we define a generalization of the swap bribery problem as follows:
An election E = (C, V ), with V = (v1, . . . , vn), a cost function πi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for every voter, a positive integer K, and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C. Question: Is there a list of votes
In the destructive variant (D, E)-DESTRUCTIVE DISTANCE BRIBERY we have the same input, but we ask whether there is an alternative profile
Hence we want to prevent p from being a winner of the election.
One restriction is that the cost function is identical for all voters. This follows the work on bribery where only a certain number of votes could be changed arbitrarily (see Faliszewski et al. [9] ). All our polynomial-time results obviously cover this restricted version, and with the exception of Theorem 7 all NP-hardness results also hold in this special case. The most general problems are those for the weighted distances, while unweighted distances are the most restricted problems. Hence, polynomial-time algorithms for swap Obviously, all decision problems are contained in NP, since the winners for all voting rules considered here can be computed in polynomial-time and as, given two votes, it is possible to compute all introduced distances in polynomial time.
Results for the constructive and destructive variants for the different distances are summarized in Table 1 . Whenever results were previously known (or follow by the above described relations), the respective source is given. For all other cases, the number of the corresponding theorem, for which the proof is provided in this paper, is given in brackets. Our results solve a number of open questions from the literature. Shiryaev et al. [18] conjectured that swap w π DESTRUCTIVE DISTANCE BRIBERY is hard for many scoring rules, especially Borda and k-approval for any fixed k ≥ 2. We confirmed this conjecture for Borda (Theorem 7) but disproved it for k-approval (Theorem 5). Obraztsova and Elkind [16] posed the question whether the swap bribery problem, where only one voter can be bribed, remains tractable for scoring rules. We give a negative answer in the case of Borda elections. In our NP-hardness proof of (swap w π , Borda)-DESTRUCTIVE DISTANCE BRIBERY (Theorem 7) there is only one voter that may be bribed. Together with the remarks after the proof, this also shows that the corresponding optimal manipulation problem for weighted swap distances is NPcomplete. Note that this proof can be extended to a larger class of scoring rules, where all entries of the scoring vector differ. In addition, Obraztsova and Elkind [16] suggested to extend the study of optimal manipulation to other distances. Since the optimal manipulation problem is a special case of [7] , Dorn and Schlotter [6] , and ♠ Shiryaev et al. [18] . For all other results the reference to the corresponding theorem is given in brackets. The NP-completeness of constructive distance bribery for swap w π for k-approval holds for a fixed k ≥ 2, whereas for swap ew π it holds for a fixed k ≥ 4.
bribery where only one voter can be bribed, all our P results carry over to the corresponding optimal manipulation problems.
Related Work The use of individual prices for the change of each vote has been introduced by Faliszewski et al. [9] for the priced bribery problem. There is however one price fixed irrespective of the change in the vote. Distance restrictions on constructive and destructive bribery problems have also been studied by Yang et al. [20] for the swap distance and the Hamming distance. In our notation the swap bribery problem corresponds to the distance bribery problem with the swap w π distance. The related bribery problems with distance restrictions introduced by Yang et al. [20] additionally include an upper bound on the number of votes that can be bribed. Since we follow the work on swap bribery we relate the upper bound of allowed bribery actions to the distance at hand. Furthermore, we consider the distance bound to be part of the input, whereas Yang et al. fix it in the problem name. It is obvious that their distance restricted bribery problem for an unlimited distance bound equals the ordinary bribery problem. Another difference is that Yang et al. bound the distance for each bribed voter, while we have a global bound on the distance, consistent with the swap bribery problem. Elkind et al. [7] show that the swap bribery problem is a generalization of the possible winner problem. However, there is no direct reduction for problems with other distance functions than the weighted swap distance. Even for the element-weighted swap distance their reduction no longer holds. On the one hand, our problem differs from the nonuniform bribery, which was introduced by Faliszewski [8] , since they use utility-based voting, while our definition applies to profiles where votes are linear orders over the candidates. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that our model can also be applied to various other preference representations, as well as to the approval vectors used by Faliszewski [8] , as long as meaningful distances can be defined on that form of representation.
Another related problem is the margin of victory in an election studied, e. g., by Magrino et al. [15] and Xia [19] , and the robustness of an election studied by Shiryaev et al. [18] . They focus on the possibility to change the election winner through some changes in the votes. It is argued that the amount of change needed to obtain a different outcome can be seen as a measure for the robustness of a voting rule. Similar as for the optimal manipulation problem the motivation is again to detect fraud in elections. The latter problem is equivalent to destructive swap bribery, and the same arguments obviously apply to the bribery problem. Hence, the distance measures used in this paper also provide a way of measuring the robustness of a voting rule.
In this section we first provide the results for the destructive case and continue by giving the results for the constructive case.
Destructive Distance Bribery
Many of our proofs for DESTRUCTIVE DISTANCE BRIBERY will make use of a non-trivial flow network designed for the distance bribery problem for k-approval elections. Before stating our results we will describe the cost flow network and some basic properties. Since this construction is fairly general it can be used to proof several different results. Due to its generality it can also be adapted to solve related problems.
Construction 4 Given a set of candidates C with {p, q} ⊆ C and a list of votes V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), such that score (C,V ) (q) > score (C,V ) (p). The purpose of the algorithm is to decide whether some candidate p can win against some candidate q in the current election through a bribery action. The cost function for voter v i will be denoted by π i . Let δ = score (C,V ) (q) − score (C,V ) (p)
If a certain operation is not possible, we will set the cost to ∞. Since → q is a single operation with the purpose of reducing the deficit by one, it is not allowed that p will also be shifted to a position giving 0 points. The same holds for the single operation
The difficulty is that performing one of these operations excludes the other two and the double operation can cost less or more than the sum of the single operations. Each single operation decreases the deficit by 1 and each double operation by 2. To determine the optimal set of operations striking out the whole deficit we will generate an optimal set of single operations for every possible number of double operations and will pick the cost minimum with respect to the given cost. Let n do and n so denote the number of double/single operations. It holds that n do ∈ {0, . . . , δ 2 } and n so = δ − 2n do . We construct a minimum-cost flow network as follows. The set of vertices is Q = {s, t} ∪ {v 1 , . . . v n } ∪ {p 1 , q 1 , pq 1 , . . . , p n , q n , pq n } ∪ {do, so}, the set of edges is R = R 1 ∪ R 2 ∪ R 3 with:
The question is, whether there is a flow of n do + n so from the source s to the sink t with minimum cost. To ensure that the total number of operations is not exceeded, the capacity of the edges from do and so to the sink t are n do and n so , respectively, and the costs are 0 for these edges. The edges from a vote vertex v i leading to one of the operation vertices (i. e., p i , q i , or pq i ) have cost cost i (o) for the corresponding operation o, and capacity 1. The cost of all remaining edges is 0 and the capacity is 1. An example for such a flow network is shown in Figure 1 . The first value on the edges refers to the costs, the second one to the capacity.
Obviously, the used edges leading to the operations are equivalent to the operations that have to be performed on the set of votes. A flow of n do + n so can only be reached by using n do double and n so single operations, providing the optimal set of operations for a fixed number of double operations. Selecting their optimal is the overall optimal set of operations.
Solving several of these minimum-cost flow problems, provides an cost optimal bribery making p better than q. To solve the decision problem, we have to check if the computed cost optimal bribery stays inside the budget K. Proof. Due to the comments made above it is sufficient to show polynomial-time solvability for (swap > (B \ B ) . While the correction of an adjacent inversion always reduces the swap distance, the footrule distance can increase since the sum of both candidates' related term's absolutes is not necessarily lowering. In order to prove the cost minimality of the above order we will argue that correcting the leftmost or rightmost inversion in a vote v i always lowers the weighted footrule distance to v i . Note that a swap of adjacent candidates only affects the footrule terms of the swapped candidates.
Assume that the pair of candidates (x, y) is the leftmost inversion in vote v i , i. e., it holds that in vote v i candidate x is preferred to y, while in v i it is the other way round. Note that, since it is the leftmost inversion, all candidates that are in front of y in v i are also in front of y in v i . Hence, swapping x and y lowers the term for candidate y in fr w π (v i , v i ) by π(x, y) since it reduces the difference of d∈{d∈C | d>v i y} π(d, y) and d∈{d∈C | d> v i y} π(d, y) by π(x, y). This holds since the former sum is, due to the previous observation increased by at least π(x, y) compared to the latter sum. So increasing the latter sum by π(x, y) through swapping x and y lowers the difference by exactly π(x, y). The x-term could be increased by at most π(x, y) so the overall distance will be lower or equal. We can use a similar approach for the rightmost inversion of candidates (x, y), where in vote v i candidate x is preferred to y and in vote v i candidate y is preferred to x. This time each candidate that is in front of
. Swapping x and y is therefore reducing the former sum by π(x, y), lowering the difference by π(x, y), and increasing the y-term by at most π(x, y). Again the overall distance will be lower or equal.
Consequently, each vote v i where A and B are switched that is deviating from the above order v * i is having a higher or the same distance to v i compared to the distance between v i and v * i . K This result directly implies polynomial time solvability for the weighted footrule variants of DESTRUCTIVE DISTANCE BRIBERY for k-approval. We continue, by considering the destructive variant of distance bribery for Borda elections. It is known that destructive shift bribery 1 and destructive unweighted swap bribery are in P for Borda (see, e. g. Kaczmarczyk and Faliszewski [13] and Shiryaev et al. [18] ). In contrast we will show that DESTRUCTIVE DISTANCE BRIBERY is NP-complete for Borda when the weighted swap distance is used.
Proof. This proof is inspired by a proof of Elkind et al. [7] for the constructive swap bribery problem. The reduction is from the BALANCED BICLIQUE problem. The input is a bipartite graph G = (U, W, E) with the sets of vertices U = {u 1 , u s , . . . , u N } and W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N }, the set of edges E ⊆ U × W , and a positive integer k ≤ N . It is a yes-instance if the graph has a bi-clique of size k (see Garey and Johnson [12] ). We construct an instance of the destructive bribery problem as follows. The set of candidates is A = {u 1 , . . . , u N , w 1 , . . . , w N , p, q, d}, the cost limit is K = N − k, and the briber's goal is to prevent q from being a winner of the election. There are only three voters v 1 , v 2 , and v 3 with the following preferences:
The cost functions π 1 and π 2 are set such that a swap between two candidates is K + 1 and hence exceeds the budget. The cost function π 3 is as follows: π 3 (u i , u j ) = π 3 (w i , w j ) = 0, for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , i = j, π 3 (w i , q) = 1, and π 3 (u i , q) = 0,
, all remaining costs will be set to K + 1, making a swap impossible. The current winner of the election is q with 6N + 3 points followed by p with 5N + 4 points. Note that due to the forbidden swaps no other candidate can become an election winner. In order to turn q into a non-winner one has to move q back to position N + 2 in v 3 . It is straightforward to see that this is only possible while staying in the distance limit if and only if G contains a bi-clique of size k. K Please note that this proof also covers the constructive case, since the question of whether q loses or p wins are equivalent for this construction. (Non-)uniquess can be adjusted by shifting p or q by one position in v 1 or v 2 .
Proof. Again, it is the briber's aim to prevent q from winning the election. Let p be the candidate that is supposed to beat q in the election and consider all p ∈ C \ {q} successively. Given two profiles V = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ) and V = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ) it holds due to the definition of the footrule distance that
where score (C,V ) (c) is the Borda score of c in the election (C, V ). We denote the deficit of p and q by δ = score (C,V ) (q) − score (C,V ) (p) + 1 and define the function cost i (k) as the minimum footrule distance between a vote v i and its modified version v i with the deficit reduced by at least k. Note that we do not consider the exact reduction of δ by k as this might not minimize the costs. If in the vote v i candidate p is ranked on a better position than q it holds cost i (k) = 2k. If however p is ranked on a lower position than q it holds that
, where x is q's and y is p's position in v i .
The optimal destructive bribery action making p score higher than q needs a budget of at least δ. We try to reduce the deficit as much as possible only by switching p and q in the individual votes which is not always sufficient. The idea is to use the pseudo-polynomial subset-of-sums algorithm (see the book by Garey and Johnson [12] ) to find those votes which reduce the deficit to an integer boundary b as much as possible by only switching p and q. The subset-of-sums algorithm takes a set of integers S and an integer value b as input. It searches for a subset of S with a sum closest to b. For each vote v j in which q is preferred to p, add 2 · (y − x) to S, where x is q's and y p's position in the current vote v j . The bound b equals δ. Note that in the constructed instance the sum of the values in S is bounded by the number of candidates and the number of voters, and hence we have a polynomial-time algorithm. Switching p and q in the votes corresponding to the subset with the sum closest to δ minimizes the costs. On the one hand, if the algorithm's result is less than δ, reducing the difference between this sum and δ by one increases the costs by 2. On the other hand, if the algorithm's result is greater than δ, reducing the difference does not minimize the costs, and we already payed a cost of two times the difference additionally.
Note that if there were another profile with smaller costs, this would be a contradiction to the optimality of the subset-of-sums result which concludes the proof. K
Constructive Distance Bribery
We now turn to the constructive case. Some of the following results refer to proofs seen above.
Theorem 9 (swap ew π , k-approval)-DISTANCE BRIBERY is NP-complete for any fixed k, k ≥ 4, even if the cost functions are identical for all voters.
Proof. NP-hardness will be shown via a reduction from the NP-complete problem X3C (see Garey and Johnson [12] ). An X3C instance consists of a set U = {u 1 , . . . , u 3q } of items and a family S = {S 1 , . . . , S r } of 3-element subsets of U . It is a yes-instance if there is a subfamily S ⊆ S with |S | = q and Si∈S S i = U . Given an X3C instance (U, S) with U = {u 1 , . . . , u 3q } and S = {S 1 , . . . , S r } we construct an instance of (swap ew π , k-approval)-DISTANCE BRIBERY as follows. The set of candidates is C = {u 1 , . . . , u 3q , p} ∪ D ∪ X, where D = {d 1 , . . . , d 4 } is a set of dummy candidates and X is a set of polynomially many blocking candidates. The list of votes is V = V s ∪ V d . V s contains one vote v i for each set S i ∈ S with S i = {u i1 , u i2 , u i3 } of the following form:
The candidates in X can be in an arbitrary order. The set V d contains polynomially many dummy votes to achieve the following scores:
, all blocking candidates in X get at most r, and there is at least one blocking candidate that gets exactly r points. In the dummy votes there is always a blocking candidate of X at the fifth position. This is obviously possible with polynomially many blocking candidates. The weight function π(p, d) = ϕ(p) · ϕ(d) is identical for all voters and it holds that ϕ(d i ) = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, ϕ(u i ) = ϕ(p) = 64, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3q, and all other weights are set to 1024q + 1. The distance bound is K = 1024q, implying that only swaps involving candidates of C and D are possible. In particular, the candidates of X in the fifth position of the dummy votes prevents that a swap in these votes leads to changes in the scores. Candidate p has to gain at least q points to win the election.
If there exists a successful bribery, p must have at least r points. The cheapest way to gain one point in a vote from V s is to move all candidates of U that are in front of p and p herself to the first four positions with a total swap cost of 1024. Any swap involving two candidates of U or a candidate of U and p has a cost of 4096, which does not leave enough budget to gain q − 1 additional points from other votes. Hence, the bribery affects exactly q votes, and each candidate of U may be shifted only once to one of the first 4 positions, since otherwise she beats p. However, if there is an exact cover S for the X3C instance it suffices to bribe the v i such that S i ∈ S in a way that the corresponding candidates of U and p gain an additional point. The cost for this bribery is 1024q, and all candidates in U , candidate p, and a subset of the blocking candidates win the election with r points. This proof can be adapted to k-approval for every fixed k, k > 4, by adding blocking candidates to the first positions of every vote in V s with a weight that prevents swaps. Proof. We show polynomial-time solvability for the weighted variant, which directly implies the results for the other two variants. Elkind et al. [7] argue that for the bribery problem with the weighted swap distance for plurality and veto elections it suffices to calculate the minimum costs of replacing the top or rearmost candidate with another specific candidate and use this value as input for the polynomial-time nonuniform-bribery algorithm of Faliszewski [8] , which needs the costs for transferring a point from one alternative to another as input. Hence it is sufficient to show that these costs can be computed in polynomial time for the weighted footrule distance. The much more general proof of Theorem 6 implies that for plurality the most cost efficient way of transferring the points from candidate cand(v i , 1) to candidate cand(v i , j) with 2 ≤ j ≤ m is to shift cand(v i , j) to the top position while moving each candidate in between one position downwards. For veto the most cost efficient way of transferring one point from cand(v i , j) with 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1 to cand(v i , m) is to shift cand(v i , j) downwards to position m while moving each candidate in between one position upwards. K Note that this approach does not extend to k-approval since the costs of transferring one point to another candidate is not independent from the other changes in the vote.
Proof. This proof makes use of an algorithm proposed by Dorn and Schlotter [6, Theorem 1] to compute a swap π cost minimum bribery for k-approval. Let V * = (v * 1 , ..., v * n ) be the swap π cost minimum bribery computed by the above mentioned algorithm. Since V * is swap π cost minimum each vote v * i fulfills the order proposed in the proof of Theorem 5. Since each v * i is 3-inversion free, 2 it holds due to Diaconis and Graham [5] 
, which extends to the overall costs:
V is cost minimum, by the proof of Theorem 6 we know that each v i fulfills the 3-inversion free order proposed in the proof, so
Substituting fr π with swap π in the above inequality leads to Proof. Hardness will be shown by a reduction from the Borda shift bribery problem with unit prices. This problem was shown to be NP-hard by Bredereck et al. [3] . It is very similar to the (swap π , Borda)-DISTANCE BRIBERY problem since each swap increases the distance by 1, but only swaps moving p forward are allowed. The reduction is based on the idea, that the only reasonable action a briber can perform on a voters vote is a swap that involves moving p a position forward.
Assume it is possible to make p win the election through K swaps shifting p forward. Then p can obviously also win by using the same K swaps in the variant where all swaps are allowed.
If it is possible to make p win the election with K unrestricted swaps, we will show that K swaps involving p are sufficient to make p the winner. First of all note, that swapping p forward involving c ∈ C \ {p}, gives p a relative advantage of 2 points compared to c and a relative advantage of 1 point to all candidates in C \ {c, p}. A swap involving two candidates x, y ∈ C \ {p} with x > j y for some j ∈ {1, ..., n} gives y a relative advantage of 1 point compared to p and p a relative advantage of 1 point compared to x. Assume the briber performed s i general swaps to vote v i . Shifting p exactly s i = min{s i , pos(v i , p)} positions forward and distributing the remaining s i − s i shifts to other votes is at least as effective as the original swaps since each candidate that has been swapped with p will also be swapped with p by shifting p forward, which gives p the original 2 points relative advantages. By the above observation each other swap can arbitrarily be replaced with a swap moving p forward in any vote. NP-hardness for (swap Proof. Hardness will be shown by a reduction from the unweighted coalitional manipulation problem for the Borda rule. This problem was shown to be NP-hard independently by Betzler at al. [2] and Davies et al. [4] . It is defined as follows. Given an election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and a number k of manipulators, the question is whether there exists a list W with |W | = k of votes, such that p is the unique Borda winner of the election (C, V ∪ W ). Given an instance of the manipulation problem with the set of candidates C = {c 1 , . . . , c m−1 , p}, the list of votes V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), and the bound k, we construct an instance for our DISTANCE BRIBERY problem as follows. The set of candidates is C = C ∪ B with B = {b 1 , . . . b 2m }. 
